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Abstract—The BGPsec protocol, which is an extension of
the border gateway protocol (BGP), uses digital signatures to
guarantee the validity of routing information. However, BGPsec’s
use of digital signatures in routing information causes a lack of
memory in BGP routers and therefore creates a gaping security
hole in today’s Internet. This problem hinders the practical
realization and implementation of BGPsec. In this paper, we
present APVAS (AS path validation based on aggregate signatures),
a new validation method that reduces memory consumption
of BGPsec when validating paths in routing information. To
do this, APVAS relies on a novel aggregate signature scheme
that compresses individually generated signatures into a single
signature in two ways, i.e., in sequential and interactive fashions.
Furthermore, we implement a prototype of APVAS on BIRD
Internet Routing Daemon and demonstrate its efficiency on
actual BGP connections. Our results show that APVAS can
reduce memory consumption by 80% in comparison with the
conventional BGPsec.
Index Terms—BGPsec, Path Validation, Aggregate Signatures,
Internet Routing, Memory Size
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Backgrounds
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [1] enables networks,
such as an Internet service provider (ISP), to exchange routing
information in the level of autonomous system (AS) by as-
signing a unique number to each AS. BGP is also the primary
routing protocol used in the backbone of the Internet. However,
BGP does not verify the validity of routing information being
exchanged, and thus an AS always registers routing informa-
tion received from other ASes as valid even if an adversary
manipulates the routing information. This fundamental flaw
in BGP has caused many incidents that resulted in heavy and
serious damages, e.g., Youtube hijacking [2] and Ethereum
hijacking [3]. According to some measurement results [4],
such a hijack happens about four times a day on average.
Therefore, guaranteeing the validity of routing information in
BGP is an urgent and significant issue.
To tackle the aforementioned issue, technologies that guar-
antee the security of BGP in a cryptographic fashion have
attracted attention. Loosely speaking, these technologies aim
to verify the validity of routing information via generation and
verification of digital signatures in the routing information.
Specifically, signatures can be used in two ways, namely,
route origin validation that only allows advertisements for an
IP prefix by the legitimate AS as a prefix owner and path
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validation that guarantees all members of an AS path which
is a connection of ASes from a source to a destination. Route
origin validation is almost consummative by virtue of the
practical realizations of RPKI [5] and ROA [6], [7] as related
protocols. In contrast, path validation has no clear practical
realization even though it is instantiated by BGPsec [8]
because its use of digital signatures significantly increases the
memory consumption of BGP routers. For instance, according
to a current estimation [22], a BGPsec is required to have
memory size of several tens of gigabytes. The issue related
to the memory size is known as the memory size problem.
Moreover, BGPsec lacks experimental evaluations and thus
a precise evaluation of the memory size problem remains
incomplete.
BGP hijacking has also given rise to hijacking of cryptocur-
rencies [9], [10], such as Bitcoin, as a new aspect of cyber-
crime. A recent finding has shown that BGP hijacking [11]
can only be prevented by the use of BGPsec. Therefore, an
essential issue in BGP security can be solved by making
BGPsec practical, i.e., by reducing memory consumption and
solving the memory size problem.
B. Contribution
In this paper, we present a new path validation protocol
named APVAS (AS path validation based on aggregate sig-
natures), which utilizes aggregate signatures [12] to combine
individual signatures into a single short signature and solve the
memory size problem. Moreover, we implement a prototype
of APVAS on a router daemon software. This is a first attempt
to measure memory size by the use of state-of-the-art cryp-
tography in actual devices. In our experimental environment,
APVAS can reduce memory consumption by 80% compared to
the conventional BGPsec. We believe that APVAS will become
an innovative solution to BGPsec.
This paper presents two technical contributions. The first
contribution is the proposal of a novel aggregate signature
scheme named bimodal aggregate signatures. Aggregate sig-
natures are expected be applicable to BGPsec in cryptographic
theory, but the algebraic structures of aggregate signatures in
early literature are unsuitable for the current specifications
of BGPsec. More precisely, when the original aggregate
signatures [12], [23] are trivially deployed in BGPsec, either
the capability for signature aggregation or security will be lost.
In contrast, APVAS can decrease the memory consumption as
well as keep the security of BGPsec by the use of bimodal
aggregate signatures (See Section IV for details).
The second contribution is the implementation of a proto-
type of APVAS by extending BIRD Internet Routing Daemon
(BIRD)1, which is a software that virtualizes a BGP router.
The lack of experimental evaluation described in the previous
subsection is caused by the lack of evaluation tools for BG-
Psec. In contrast, we succeeded in measuring the performance
of APVAS in an actual environment by leveraging BIRD.
Although our experiment was conducted on a linear network
in a simple fashion, as far as we aware this is the first time that
aggregate signatures are evaluated in an actual environment.
Moreover, by extending our prototype, we can potentially
evaluate protocols in future works (See Section VI for details).
We plan to release the prototype of APVAS to encourage
development of BGPsec and future works.
II. RELATED WORKS
The closest works to APVAS are the aggregate path authen-
tication [14] and APAT [15]. These works introduced aggre-
gate signatures [12] in BGPsec (and S-BGP [16]) to aggregate
individually generated signatures into a single short signature.
However, they did not discuss the serious issue of memory
consumption. Moreover, they did not provide improvements
to aggregate signatures and a prototype implementation on a
BGP software, which are our main technical contributions.
Surprisingly, there is no commercial implementation of the
original BGPsec itself [17] although BGPsec fully overcomes
security concerns according to recent works [11], [18].
In the past years, BGP security research [19]–[21] aimed
to serve a quick response with “decent” security by utilizing
filtering instead of digital signatures. For example, the use
of filtering can prevent 85% of hijacking [20], whereas paths
can be repaired from a hijacking within a minute [21]. These
results have shown how threats are mitigated in the real world.
However, we mentioned that when the filtering-based approach
is used, it is difficult to distinguish whether hijacking is done
by a defense against DDoS or by an adversary from the
standpoint of a third party.
III. BORDER GATEWAY PROTOCOL SECURITY EXTENSION
(BGPSEC)
In this section, we provide backgrounds on BGP hijacking,
path validation, and the main problem of BGPsec.
A. Motivating Example: BGP Hijacking
As a motivating example of BGPsec, we explain route
hijacking on BGP below. As described in Section I, BGP is
a protocol used for finding a route to a destination on the
entireInternet in per AS unit. Each AS is assigned a unique AS
number, and BGP uses these AS numbers to distinguish each
AS and exchanges routing information via TCP. After a TCP
connection is established, ASes exchange routing information
with each other by sending and receiving an update message
containing Network Layer Reachability Information (NLRI)
and the AS PATH.
1BIRD: https://bird.network.cz/
Fig. 1. Route Advertisement Fig. 2. Example of Route Hijacking
Fig. 3. Format of BGPsec PATH At-
tribute
Fig. 4. Sequence of Octets to Be
Hashed
Fig. 1 shows an example of a route advertisement on BGP.
The route to AS1 with 192.0.2.0/24 registered in A4 is AS3
AS2 AS1. However, the AS_PATH included in the update
message can be intentionally rewritten by an AS to launch
a route hijacking. As shown in Fig. 2, AS5 advertises AS4 a
shorter route to AS1, i.e., AS5 AS1. Despite the nonexistence
of the route information, AS4 registers this information in its
routing table according to the best path selection algorithm.
BGPsec [8] prevents route hijacking by validating the
AS_PATH with the use of digital signatures on the routing
information. Hereafter, we focus on the path validation pro-
vided by BGPsec.
B. Path Validation
In BGPsec [8], BGPsec_PATH attributes are defined in-
stead of the AS_PATH attributes of BGP. BGPsec_PATH
attributes contain Secure_PATH and Signature_Block
as shown in Fig. 3. Secure_PATH lists the AS numbers
of each AS that the routing information passed through, and
it is identical to AS_PATH of the conventional BGP. In
contrast, Signature_Block stores digital signatures gen-
erated by each AS specified in Secure_PATH. The signature
length varies according to the signature algorithm specified by
Algorithm Suite Identifier.
Parameters of data strings to be signed are shown in Fig. 4.
Each AS sends and receives an update message containing
TABLE I
EXISTING EVALUATION OF MEMORY SIZE FOR BGPSEC
BGP BGPsec
Year
Number of
Paths
Memory
Size [GB]
Number of
Paths
Memory
Size [GB]
2020 6332177 0.13 6332177 2.79
2021 4433446 0.09 10130562 4.47
2022 2547235 0.05 14201374 6.62
2023 1149812 0.02 18111088 7.99
2024 355617 0.01 21794419 9.61
2025 0 0 25472541 11.23
these parameters. We describe the important parameters below:
Target AS Number: AS number of the destination of routing
information.
Signature Segment: Digital signatures, where the number of
the signatures is identical to the number of ASes that the
routing information passed through excluding the route origin.
Secure Path Segments: AS numbers of ASes that the routing
information passed through, where at least the AS number of
the route origin is required.
Algorithm Suite Identifier: An identifier for specifying the
signature algorithm used for signature generation.
NLRI: Values of network addresses and their subnet mask
managed by the route origin.
C. Problem Setting
Since an update message on BGPsec contains digital sig-
natures, the size of the update message balloons and a big
part of which comes from the digital signatures. National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [22] has shown
the estimation results for memory size of routers on BGPsec.
According to NIST, a BGP update message has an average
size of 78 bytes, while a BGPsec update message is 388 bytes
to 1188 bytes in size depending on the signature algorithms.
We recall the result with ECDSA-256 in Table I. In this
table, the columns of Memory Size show total values with
respect to routing tables registering destinations and those
route attributes. Route information on BGPsec with respect to
the world-wide level, i.e., full routes, requires a router to own
more than 10 gigabytes of memory. Discussions and deploy-
ment of BGPsec have begun in 2016, and the deployment is
estimated to finish in 2025. However, the complete deployment
is nowhere in sight due to the memory size problem.
IV. BIMODAL AGGREGATE SIGNATURES
In this section, we discuss the bimodal aggregate signature
scheme used as a new building block in APVAS. In our
proposed scheme, when n users generate n individual sig-
natures, these signatures can be aggregated in two ways, i.e.,
an interactive style of general aggregate signatures [12] and a
signature-chain style of sequential aggregate signatures [23].
Compared with conventional aggregate signatures [12], [23],
bimodal aggregate signatures can provide the security of
BGPsec by virtue of signature chains as well as the efficiency
of aggregating individual signatures even on individual paths.
Specifically, the security of BGPsec depends on signature
chains and only the sequential aggregate signatures provide
such chains via signature aggregation. On the other hand,
to improve efficiency, i.e., reduce memory consumption, sig-
natures even on individual paths should be aggregated, and
such capability is inspired only by signature aggregation of
the general aggregate signatures. In other words, when either
one of the conventional aggregate signatures is deployed, only
one of either the security or the efficiency is guaranteed. In
contrast, the use of bimodal aggregate signatures can solve
the memory size problem without sacrificing the security.
We show the algorithms of the bimodal aggregate signature
scheme below.
The proposed scheme is based on pairings defined as
follows. Let G and GT be groups with a prime order p.
Then, a bilinear map e : G × G → GT is a map with
the following conditions: for any U, V ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z∗p,
e(aU, bV ) = e(U, V )ab holds; for any generator P ∈ G,
e(P, P ) 6= 1GT holds, where 1GT is an identity element
in GT ; and, for any U, V ∈ G, e(U, V ) can be computed
efficiently. We assume that solving the discrete logarithm
problems in G and GT is computationally hard. We call
the parameter (p,G,GT , e) achieving the conditions above as
pairing parameter.
Hereafter, each signer is represented by a unique index i
in the algorithms for convenience. We denote by S a set of
signers for any signature and by Si a set of signers who join
a chain of signatures from 1 to i for any i. We also denote by
‖ a concatenation of any string and by ‖j∈Si concatenations
of strings for any signer j ∈ Si. We show the construction
in Algorithms 1–5. The fourth line of Algorithm 3 and
the third line of Algorithm 5 are identical to a signature
chain, i.e., σ indicates a signature. More precisely, σ indicates
a signature, and e(σ, P ) in Algorithm 3 and e(cj , Xi) in
Algorithm 5 are identical to computations which are the main
core for verification of signatures. Intuitively, by inputting
signatures and their verifications to a hash function, the same
signature chains are constructed. Even after σs themselves
are aggregated and lost, the corresponding e(cj , Xi)’s can
be computed. Therefore, both a signature chain of sequential
aggregate signatures and an interactive aggregation of general
Algorithm 1 Setup
Ensure: Public parameter para
1: Generate pairing parameter (p,G,GT , e)
2: P ← G
3: Choose a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G
4: para = (p,G,GT , e, P,H)
Algorithm 2 UserKeyGen
Require: Public parameter para
Ensure: Secret key sk, public key pk
1: x← Zp
2: X = xP
3: sk = x, pk = X
aggregate signatures can be provided simultaneously. The
security of the proposed scheme can be proven formally under
the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random
oracle model. We omit the details due to page limitation.
V. DESIGN OF APVAS
In this section, we present AS path validation based on
aggregate signatures (APVAS) as a new path validation pro-
tocol for BGPsec. As described in Section I, APVAS is
based on bimodal aggregate signatures. We first describe how
bimodal aggregate signatures are deployed for path validation
as a protocol specification. Then, we describe the prototype
implementation on BIRD Internet routing daemon (BIRD),
which is a software for BGP.
A. Protocol Specification
The specification of route advertisements on APVAS is
shown in Fig. 5. Each intermediate AS takes information from
the received update message and then verifies the routing
information with Algorithm 5. Then, for the received rout-
ing information and aggregate signatures, an AS generates
a new aggregate signature with Algorithm 3 and sends it
to the neighbor ASes. Meanwhile, when an AS receives an
update message including routing information from a different
ORIGIN, the AS generates an aggregate signature as described
above and then aggregates those signatures with Algorithm 4.
Signature Segment Format defined in the BGPsec
protocol contains Subject Key Identifier (SKI)
with size of 20 bytes, Signature Length with size of
2 bytes, and Signature with a variable length. In con-
trast, to contain only a single signature in APVAS, SKI is
defined as SKI Segment with size of 20 bytes. The new
Signature_Block Format of APVAS is shown in Fig. 6.
The proposed scheme, i.e., Algorithms 1–5, is utilized as
the signature in APVAS as described above. We note that a
plaintext m corresponds to a received update message. More
Algorithm 3 SeqAggSign
Require: public parameter para, secret key ski, public key
pki, plaintext mi ∈ {0, 1}∗, list L = {(pkj ,mj)}j∈S of
public keys and plaintexts, signature σ
Ensure: Signature σ, list L′ = {(pkj ,mj)}j∈S ∪{(pki,mi)}
of public keys and plaintexts
1: if L = ∅ then
2: set σ = 0
3: end if
4: c = H (e(σ, P ) ‖ pki ‖ mi ‖j∈Si (pkj ‖ mj))
5: σ = σ + x ·H(c)
Algorithm 4 AggSign
Require: public parameter para, list L1 = {(pkj ,mj)}j∈S
of public keys and plaintexts, list L2 = {(pkj,mj)}j∈S′
of public keys and plaintexts, signature σ1, signature σ2
Ensure: signature σ, list L′ = L1 ∪ L2
1: σ = σ1 + σ2
Fig. 5. Route Advertisement on APVAS
Fig. 6. Signature_Block
Format on APVAS
precisely, for data storing shown in Fig. 4, the remaining string
except for Signature Segment Format is utilized asm.
Likewise, for verification of update messages, the intermediate
values of computation, i.e., outputs of bilinear maps, are
utilized instead of a hashed value utilized for the previous
signers to generate signatures because the update messages
do not include the hashed values. Consequently, the size of
update messages and the data size to be stored are reduced.
B. Prototype Implementation
We implement a prototype of APVAS by extending the
BGPsec-enabled BIRD [13], which is an implementation of
BGPsec on BIRD, with a pairing library TEPLA2.
BIRD is a daemon software that utilizes a computer as a
BGP router, and new functions can be introduced by writ-
ing in the C language. By editing a configuration file, we
can set a router configuration and a network topology. The
BGPsec-enabled Bird Routing Daemon [13] is an extension
of BIRD released by Secure Routing3, and we implemented
the prototype of APVAS by extending the BGPsec-enabled
Bird Routing Daemon.
Source codes related to BGP are in directories under
proto/bgp/, and the codes to be improved are as
2TEPLA: http://www.cipher.risk.tsukuba.ac.jp/tepla/index.html
3Secure Routing: http://www.securerouting.net/
Algorithm 5 Verify
Require: public parameter para, list L = {(pkj ,mj)}j∈S of
public keys and plaintexts, signature σ
Ensure: True or False
1: For any i ∈ S, parse pki as Xi
2: if all (pki,mi) ∈ S are distinct then
3: ∀i, ci = H
((∏
j∈S e(cj , Xi)
)
‖j∈Si (pkj ‖ mj)
)
4: if e(σ, P ) =
∏
i∈S e(H(ci), Xi) then
5: return True
6: end if
7: end if
8: return False
TABLE II
VERSION OF LIBRARY AND UTILIZED PARAMETERS
TEPLA ver. 2.0
Pairing ECBN254a
Finite Field bn254 fpa
P (Pre-generated) 1462ea218754f628c4...
follows. First, we improve encoding and decoding of update
messages by modifying the encode_bgpsec_attr()
function and the decode_bgpsec_attr()
function in attrs.c, respectively. We also improve
signature generation and verification by replacing the
bgpsec_sign_data_with_key() function and the
bgpsec_verify_signature_with_key() function in
validate.c, respectively, with an implementation of the
bimodal aggregate signatures with TEPLA. The parameters
utilized in pairing computation are shown in Table II.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
We created a prototype implementation of APVAS and
conducted experiments on a virtual network with a simple
topology to evaluate the memory consumption of APVAS
and compare it with the results of the conventional method.
The main purpose of our experiments is to take a first step
in understanding the performance, i.e., in terms of memory
consumption, of APVAS on actual devices.
A. Experimental Environment
While BIRD can deal with many kinds of network topolo-
gies, a linear network is the simplest network topology for
understanding the relationship between the number of paths
and the average AS_PATH length. In such a topology, AS
routers are connected with each other in a linear manner.
Moreover, the number of paths advertised to the network is the
total number of paths statically advertised by each AS, and the
average AS_PATH length is an average of distances between
ASes which advertise the paths. In the experiment described
below, we focus on a linear network to evaluate APVAS.
Six virtual routers are configured under the machine envi-
ronment shown in Table III, and private AS numbers from
65001 to 65006 are assigned to these routers, respectively.
Each router is assigned a static IP from 192.168.0.201 to 206
in accordance with the lowest digit of its own AS number, and
the routers connect with each other to configure the network.
For example, when AS65001 advertises routing information,
the other ASes receive the same routing information. In doing
so, the average AS_PATH length is identical to a difference
between AS numbers, making the evaluation of data easy.
Since the upper bound for route advertisement whereby BIRD
works stably is 250 according to our pre-experiments, we
adopt the number of paths advertised by AS65001 from 50,
100, 150, 200, and 250, respectively. For instance, in a case
where AS65001 advertises 200 paths to AS65004, the latter
AS receives the 200 paths whose AS_PATH length is 3. In the
setting described above, the memory consumption for routers
owning 200 paths with length 3 can be estimated.
TABLE III
ENVIRONMENT
OS Ubuntu 16.04 LTS
CPU Intel Core i7-6500U
Memory 1 GB
VMware ver. Workstation Pro 14.1.2
BIRD ver. 1.6.0
BIRD BGPsec ver. 0.9
TABLE IV
MEMORY SIZE OF APVAS (WITH 200 PATHS)
Memory Size [KB]
AS Number 65002 65003 65004 65005 65006
Routing Table 46 46 46 46 46
Route Attribute 116 122 128 134 140
We evaluate the memory consumption of AS65002 to
AS65006 based on the environment described above. Note
that the process of obtaining a pair of secret and pubic keys is
outside the scope of the experiment. We suppose that the pair
of keys is generated and installed on each router in advance.
Likewise, routing information for advertisement is randomly
generated in advance.
B. Results
The memory consumption when each AS receives 200 paths
is shown in Table IV. The table shows only the memory size
related to routing tables and route attributes, although BIRD
includes the routing tables, route attributes, Route Origin Au-
thorization (ROA) table, and the protocol information. APVAS
is successful in reducing the memory size in comparison
with the conventional BGPsec because the sizes of other
information in the current specification [8], e.g., ROA tables
and the protocol itself, are stable in our experiment. The results
of the memory consumption under the same setting for BGP
routers and the conventional BGPsec routers are shown in
Table V and Table VI, respectively, and the entire data is
visualized in the continuous lines of Fig. 7.
The results show that the memory size of APVAS is smaller
than that of the conventional BGPsec. The memory size of AP-
VAS becomes larger at the average AS_PATH length 1 because
of the data size of the bimodal aggregate signatures. More
precisely, while the conventional BGPsec utilizes ECDSA with
bit length of 384 bits per signature, the bimodal aggregate
signatures have bit length of 512 bits.
C. Consideration
According to the empirical study of Wang et al. [25], the
average AS_PATH length on the Internet is about 3.9 and
the longest path is about 20. When the average AS_PATH
length is 4, the size of route attributes by APVAS became
80% less than the conventional BGPsec. The bulk of memory
consumption is related to the size of route attributes [22], and
thus the results above confirm that APVAS can reduce memory
consumption by 80%. Furthermore, the memory consumption
until length 20 can be estimated by the least squares method
TABLE V
MEMORY SIZE OF BGP ROUTERS (WITH 200 PATHS)
Memory Size [KB]
AS Number 65002 65003 65004 65005 65006
Routing Table 46 46 46 46 46
Route Attribute 10 10 10 10 10
TABLE VI
MEMORY SIZE OF BGPSEC ROUTERS (WITH 200 PATHS)
Memory Size [KB]
AS Number 65002 65003 65004 65005 65006
Routing Table 46 46 46 46 46
Route Attribute 104 124 144 164 188
Fig. 7. Memory Size: The continuous lines are actual measurements on the
experiments while the dotted lines are estimations from the measurements.
based on the experimental results as shown on the dotted
lines in Fig. 7. In proportion to the length of AS_PATH,
the difference in the memory consumption between APVAS
and the conventional BGPsec will become larger because the
memory size of APVAS is stable from the aggregate signatures
via Algorithm 4 even if different route attributes appear.
As shown in Table I, the memory consumption of BGPsec
is expected to increase in the future, and APVAS can be a
practical solution. We are in the process of creating a detailed
discussion on the performance of APVAS.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed APVAS, a path validation
method that deploys novel bimodal aggregate signatures to
reduce memory consumption on BGPsec. We implemented a
prototype of APVAS via BIRD and measured the memory
consumption with actual routers. Our experimental results
confirm that APVAS can reduce memory consumption by 80%
in comparison with conventional BGPsec. We are preparing
for the release of our implementation of APVAS to encourage
development of BGPsec and future works. We hope that
APVAS will serve as a base for future studies on BGPsec.
We plan to experiment further with full routes as future
work. Although the experiments in this paper were conducted
on a linear network as the simplest topology as the first step
of a long way to practical realization, the performance in an
environment with full routes should be clarified before deploy-
ment in the world-wide level. Furthermore, we discovered a
new problem where the throughput of routers is downgraded
by the computational cost of bimodal aggregate signatures,
which is heavier than that of ECDSA. Thus, further studies
on reducing not only the memory consumption but also the
computational cost, which takes misconfiguration such that a
large amount of routing information is advertised into account,
will need to be undertaken.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This research was supported in part by the Japan Society
for the Promotion of Science KAKENHI Numbers 18K18049
and the Secom Science and Technology Foundation.
REFERENCES
[1] Yakov Rekhter, Susan Hares, and Tony Li. A Border Gateway Protocol
4 (BGP-4). Number 4271 in Request for Comments. RFC Editor, 2006.
Published: RFC 4271.
[2] YouTube Hijacking: A RIPE NCC RIS case study. 2008.
[3] Aftab Siddiqui. What Happened? The Amazon Route 53 BGP Hijack
to Take Over Ethereum Cryptocurrency Wallets.
[4] Pierre-Antoine Vervier, Olivier Thonnard, and Marc Dacier. Mind your
blocks: On the stealthiness of malicious BGP hijacks. In Proc. of NDSS
2015. Internet Society, 2015.
[5] Martin Lepinski and Stephen Kent. An Infrastructure to Support Secure
Internet Routing. RFC 6480, 2012.
[6] Matt Lepinski, Derrick Kong, and Stephen Kent. A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs). RFC 6482, February 2012.
[7] Geoff Huston and George G. Michaelson. Validation of Route Origina-
tion Using the Resource Certificate Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and
Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs). RFC 6483, February 2012.
[8] Matthew Lepinski and Kotikalapudi Sriram. BGPsec Protocol Speci-
fication. Number 8205 in Request for Comments. RFC Editor, 2017.
Published: RFC 8205.
[9] Maria Apostolaki, Aviv Zohar, and Laurent Vanbever. Hijacking bitcoin:
Routing attacks on cryptocurrencies. In IEEE S&P 2017, pages 375–
392, 2017.
[10] Parinya Ekparinya, Vincent Gramoli, and Guillaume Jourjon. The attack
of the clones against proof-of-authority. In Proc. of NDSS 2020. Internet
Society, 2020.
[11] Henry Birge-Lee, Liang Wang, Jennifer Rexford, and Prateek Mittal.
Sico: Surgical interception attacks by manipulating bgp communities.
In Proc. of CCS 2019, page 431448. ACM, 2019.
[12] Dan Boneh, Craig Gentry, Ben Lynn, and Hovav Shacham. Aggregate
and verifiably encrypted signatures from bilinear maps. pages 416–432,
2003.
[13] Bird bgpsec. http://www.securerouting.net/tools/bird/ .
[14] Meiyuan Zhao, Sean W. Smith, and David M. Nicol. Aggregated path
authentication for efficient BGP security. In Proc. of CCS 2005, pages
128–138. ACM, 2005.
[15] Kazuma Tanaka, Naoto Yanai, Masayuki Okada, Takashi Nishide, and
Eiji Okamoto. APAT: An Application of Aggregate Signatures to
BGPSEC. In Fast Abstract in the 46th Annual IEEE/IFIP International
Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, 2016.
[16] Stephen Kent, Charles Lynn, and Karen Seo. Secure border gateway
protocol (S-BGP). IEEE Journal on Selected areas in Communications,
18(4):582–592, 2000.
[17] Kotikalapudi Sriram and Douglas C. Montgomery. Resilient Interdomain
Traffic Exchange: BGP Security and DDos Mitigation. NIST Report,
2019.
[18] Jared M Smith, Kyle Birkeland, Tyler McDaniel, and Max Schuchard.
Withdrawing the bgp re-routing curtain: Understanding the security
impact of bgp poisoning through real-world measurements. In Proc.
of NDSS 2020. Internet Society, 2020.
[19] Sharon Goldberg. Why is it taking so long to secure internet routing?
Queue, 12(8):2033, 2014.
[20] Robert Lychev, Michael Schapira, and Sharon Goldberg. Rethinking
security for internet routing. Communication of the ACM, 59(10):4857,
2016.
[21] Pavlos Sermpezis, Vasileios Kotronis, Petros Gigis, Xenofontas Dim-
itropoulos, Danilo Cicalese, Alister King, and Alberto Dainotti. Artemis:
Neutralizing bgp hijacking within a minute. IEEE/ACM Transactions on
Networking, 26(6):2471–2486, 2018.
[22] K Sriram. RIB Size Estimation for BGPSEC. 2011.
[23] Anna Lysyanskaya, Silvio Micali, Leonid Reyzin, and Hovav Shacham.
Sequential aggregate signatures from trapdoor permutations. In Proc. of
EUROCRYPT 2004, pages 74–90, 2004.
[24] TEPLA (University of Tsukuba Elliptic Curve and Pairing Library),
2015.
[25] Cun Wang, Zhengmin Li, Xiaohong Huang, and Pei Zhang. Inferring
the average as path length of the internet. In Proc. of IC-NIDC, pages
391–395. IEEE, 2016.
